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Create a Social History of Ideas 
Robert Darnton 
Pri,icetoIl  Ulniversitv 
The history of the Enlightenment  has always been a lofty affair-a  tendency 
that will not be regretted  by anyone who has scaled its peaks with Cassirer, 
sucked in delicious lungfuls of pure reason, and surveyed the topography  of 
eighteenth-century  thought laid out neatly at his feet. But the time has come 
for a more down-to-earth  look at the Enlightenment,  because while intellec- 
tual historians  have mapped  out the view from the top, social historians  have 
been burrowing  deep into the substrata  of eighteenth-century  societies. And, 
as the distance  between the two disciplines  increases,  the climates of opinion 
multiply  and thicken and the Enlightenment  occasionally  disappears  in clouds 
of vaporous  generalizations.  The need to locate it more precisely in a social 
context has produced  some important  new work in a genre that is coming to 
be called the "social  history of ideas." 
Peter Gay, who has sponsored  the term,' has attempted  to satisfy the need 
with  the  second  volume  of  The  Enlightenment:  An  Interpretation  (New 
York, 1969). A half year after the appearance  of Gay's book, another  second- 
volume work came out in France: Livre et societ  (Paris, 1970),  the sequel 
to a pioneering  collection of essays on sociointellectual  history produced by 
a group at the VIP  Section of the Ecole Pratique  des Hautes Etudes in Paris. 
These two volume 2's make fascinating reading  together, because they show 
two different  historiographical  traditions converging on the same problem. 
Gay descends  from Cassirer,  the VIP  Section  group from the "Annales"  school 
and from Daniel Mornet's  experiments  with quantitative  history. Curiously, 
the two traditions  seem to ignore  each other. In a bibliography  that totals 261 
pages in both volumes, and that covers an enormous range of  European 
history,  Gay never mentions Livre et societ.  He makes only a few, irrever- 
ent references  to Mornet and does not seem to have assimilated  much "An- 
nales" history. The second volume of Livre et societe' (the first appeared a 
year before Gay's first volume) does not refer either to Gay or Cassirer.  In 
fact,  Cassirer's The Philosophy  of  the Enlightenment  was  not translated  into 
French  until 1966 and has not made much impression  on French study of the 
Enlightenment  since its original  publication  in German in 1932, a year before 
the appearance of Mornet's Les origines  intellectuelles  de la Re'volution fran- 
(aise  and fourteen  years before  Paul  Hazard's La pensee  europeenne  au  18' 
siecle.  So here is an opportunity  to compare the methods and results of two 
attempts,  expressing  two separate  historiographical  currents,  to solve one of 
the knottiest  problems in early modern history: the problem of situating the 
Enlightenment  within the actualities  of eighteenth-century  society. 
l Peter Gay, The Parlty of  Humanity:  Essays  in  the Frenclh Enliglhtetinment (New 
York, 1964), p. x. 1 14  Robert Darnton 
I 
Gay came to the social history of  ideas through an attempt to redefine the 
Enlightenment.  He wanted his "definition"  (as he modestly describes  his two 
large  volumes) to incorporate  the social dimension  of the philosophes'  experi- 
ence into a Cassirer-like  interpretation  of their ideas. This concern testifies to 
the ever-expanding  influence  of social history  today, but it does not ultimately 
determine  the character  of Gay's book, which can be read as intellectual  his- 
tory of the sort that has flourished  in the United States for the last few de- 
cades. If read in this way, it offers a delightful tour of  the Enlightenment, 
theme by theme, philosophe  by philosophe. Gay cuts his way through cliches 
and breathes new life into figures that had been embalmed and placed on 
permanent  exhibit in the nineteenth century. His philosophes are not desic- 
cated rationalists,  naive prophets  of progress,  or narrow-minded  village athe- 
ists. They are complicated individuals  with complicated problems, irrational 
in their calculations  of pleasure and pain, and pessimistic in their dedication 
to the advancement  of  civilization. Gay does justice to these complexities, 
especially in the first two chapters of volume 2, by relating the philosophes' 
ideas to their experience  and by eschewing worn-out labels like "The Age of 
Reason."  His own labeling  sometimes  creates  confusion, as when he describes 
eighteenth-century  empiricism as a  "revolt against rationalism." (Cassirer, 
and even d'Alembert, made the point clearer by contrasting the "esprit de 
systeme" of  the seventeenth century with the "esprit systematique"  of  the 
eighteenth.) But the book makes the philosophes live. Its strength consists 
in its stress  on the complex, human dimension of their philosophy. 
Although Gay's Enlightenment  will delight and instruct  anyone who wants 
to freshen  his sense of the past, it deserves  to be read as its author intended: 
not as just another work on the eighteenth century, but as an attempt to 
establish a new historical genre. Gay needed to develop a social history of 
ideas in order to bring together the highly distilled philosophical history of 
Cassirer  and the highly specific  findings  of social history.2  Crossbreeding  such 
different  historical species raises enormous problems, because Cassirer dealt 
with modes of thought,  like the rise of "critical"  as opposed to "mythopoeic" 
thinking,  while social historians  are concerned  with a different  order of phe- 
nomena, like the rise of the bourgeoisie.  In order to reconcile such opposed 
viewpoints,  Gay adopts a Hegelian device: he defines the Enlightenment  as 
a  "dialectical  struggle for autonomy" (The Enlightenment, 1:xi; all refer- 
ences are to this work unless otherwise stated). 
The history of history is so strewn with dead dialectics that it might seem 
rash to create a new one as the conceptual framework  for a new kind of his- 
tory. But Gay's social history of  ideas will not hold together without his 
dialectic,  so the dialectic deserves  to be examined with care. It goes like this: 
thesis-"The  Appeal to Antiquity" (book 1); antithesis-"The  Tension with 
Christianity"  (book 2);  synthesis-"The  Pursuit of  Modernity" (book 3). 
Gay explains that he is dealing with the Enlightenment  in its narrow sense, 
the philosophy of  the philosophes, not with the broad climate of  opinion 
2 Ibid.  See also Peter  Gay, Tlhe  Enlighlteniment:  An Interpretation  (New York, 
1966), 1: 427; and esp. Peter Gay, "The Social History of Ideas: Ernst Cassirer  and 
After,"  in The Critical  Spirit:  Essays  in Honor  of Herbert  Marcuse,  ed. Kurt H. 
Wolff and Barrington Moore, Jr. (Boston, 1967). In Search of the Enlightenment  115 
comprising the "Age of  the Enlightenment."  He  argues persuasively  that the 
philosophes'  philosophy  can be treated as a coherent  historical  phenomenon, 
despite their quarrels and contradictions,  because  they  comprised  a coherent 
unit, a "family"; and their dialectic  should  be  understood  as  a  result  of  the 
family's  actual  experience  in  the  actual  environment  of  eighteenth-century 
Europe and America.  Accordingly,  the philosophes  responded  to  the  demys- 
tifying  message  of  the  classics,  turned  that  message  against  Christian  my- 
thology,  and then liberated themselves  from  their liberators by  rejecting neo- 
classicism  and embracing  modernity.  Modernity,  autonomy,  or "The Science 
of  Freedom"  (Gay  sticks  so  many  ingenious  titles  and  subtitles  to  his  text 
that it is difficult to remove  his  ideas  from  their packaging)  means  humane, 
critical,  tolerant,  realistic  liberalism-a  faith  worthy  of  modern  modernity, 
Gay suggests, for he has no pretense of writing value-free  history. 
This  dialectical  definition  raises the  problem  of  determining  what  set  the 
Enlightenment  apart  in  time  as  a  distinct  phenomenon.  If  Gay's  dialectic 
cannot be pinned down with precision  and supported by rigorous reference  to 
evidence,  it may float away like the most ethereal Hegelianism:  for no dialec- 
tic can be static, even if it is intended only as a "definition." It therefore seems 
best to follow  the unfolding  of  Gay's  Enlightenment  stage  by  stage,  pausing 
to  take up themes  as they  appear-notably  in  the  case  of  the  antireligious, 
"revolutionary,"  and  psychological  aspects  of  the  Enlightenment-and  re- 
serving two special themes for the end:  the Enlightenment's  relation to socio- 
political issues and to the spread of literacy. 
Assuming  that the  Enlightenment  originated  with  an  appeal  to  antiquity, 
the problem is to show what in antiquity appealed to the incipient  Enlighten- 
ment  rather than  to  other  eras.  Gay  reveals  an  affinity  between  the  philo- 
sophes and the ancients, but he does not prove that the philosophes  read their 
classics differently than did the "classical" writers of  the seventeenth  century. 
Even if Gay's argument could be proven-and  to do so would  require a mul- 
titude of studies in comparative  literature as thorough  as Jean Seznec's  Essaiis 
slur Diderot  et l'antiquite  and Reuben  Brower's Alexander  Pope:  The Poetry 
of Alllision-the  differences in the response to the ancients  would  have to be 
explained,  and the explanation  might  involve  elements  that  are  unrelated  to 
Gay's  "thesis." Gay's  discussion  of  the  Renaissance  illustrates  this  difficulty, 
because he argues that the classical  revival during the  Renaissance  produced 
the same dialectic  as that of  the Enlightenment.  Then,  in order to  avoid  en- 
tangling dialectics  or interpreting the Enlightenment  as a rerun of the Renais- 
sance, he is forced  to emphasize  the elements  that separated  the  two  periods 
-the  reawakening  of  religious  controversy  and the  subsequent  spirit of  tol- 
eration  and skepticism,  the  scientific  revolution,  and  the  systematic  philoso- 
phies  of  the  seventeenth  century.  But  are  not  these  new  developments  pre- 
cisely  the ones  that brought  about the  Enlightenment?  And  are they  not  ex- 
traneous to Gay's  dialectic?  Sensing  this danger,  Gay  tries to  fit Montaigne, 
Grotius, Bayle,  Bacon,  Descartes,  Newton,  and Locke  into  a chapter entitled 
"Pagan Christianity," one  of the hybrid terms like  "Epicurean Stoicism"  that 
he seems to coin  when his argument is overstrained.  An  admixture of  pagan- 
ism and Christianity  may  have  colored  the  ideas  of  those  thinkers  as  it did 
in the thought  of  such  pagan-Christians  as Aquinas  and  Augustine,  but  the 
real question  at issue is:  What was  fundamental  and what  accidental  in pro- 
ducing the Enlightenment?  It will  not do  to  display  the pagan-Christian  dia- 116  Robert Darnton 
lectic at the front door and to smuggle Montaigne, Grotius, Bayle, Bacon, 
Descartes, Newton, and Locke in the back. Once those men have got a foot 
inside they will take over, making it impossible  to preserve  the dialectic even 
as window dressing. 
The Enlightenment's  enemies present as many problems as its precursors 
for Gay's thesis, because, according  to Fran9ois  Bluche, the magistrates  of the 
Parlement of  Paris had the same favorite authors as Gay's philosophes- 
Cicero, Horace, Ovid, and Vergil.3 And according to  the Livre et societe 
group, the educated but unphilosophic general public shared the same taste 
for the classics. In order to explain why the philosophes reacted peculiarly to 
the common stock of  their culture, Gay would have been forced back to 
standard  accounts of the Enlightenment's  origins, which he seems to avoid. 
His own account does not deal with the classic studies of  Paul Hazard and 
Philippe Sagnac, which argue that the French Enlightenment  grew out of  a 
profound crisis during the last years of  Louis XIV's reign; nor does it in- 
corporate the recent work on  the "crise de  conscience" period by  Pierre 
Goubert and Lionel Rothkrug. Gay barely mentions Fenelon, Saint-Simon, 
and Boulainvilliers;  and he entirely ignores Vauban, La Bruyere, and Bois- 
guillebert. 
While Gay has difficulty  in getting his thesis off and running,  his antithesis 
almost runs away with him. Here the main theme is the radicalization  of the 
Enlightenment's  antireligious character. Gay  sees  it  advancing inexorably 
from toleration to skepticism, deism, and the full-blooded atheism of Hume 
and Holbach. The philosophes certainly undermined established churches, 
but few of  them, even in the coterie Holbachique, went over to  atheism.4 
And some intellectual  currents  flowed in the opposite direction-from  the arid 
atheism of Toland and Woolston in Britain and the godless Temple poets 
in France  to the Great Awakening  that spread  across Europe from Stockholm, 
Saint Petersburg,  and Bavaria  during  the prerevolutionary  decade. As Auguste 
Viatte has shown, the Enlightenment  went out in a great blaze of illuminism. 
How incompatible  were Christianity  and the Enlightenment,  in any case? 
They were enemies in France, but there philosophy fed on persecution  and a 
tradition of  anticlericalism  absent in Protestant countries. Perhaps, also, it 
owed more to Jansenism  than Voltaire, in his horror at the convulsionaires, 
wanted to admit. Such, at least, is a hypothesis dangled temptingly in "The 
Enlightenment:  Free Inquiry and the World of Ideas," an essay by Robert 
Shackleton  in the new volume edited by the late Alfred Cobban. Shackleton 
detects "a de facto alliance, in many respects surprising,  between Jansenism 
3 Fran,ois Bluche, Les magistrats  du Parlemetit  de  Paris au XVIII  sicle 
(17I5-1771)  (Paris, 1960),  p. 294. 
4 In his Memoires  de I'abbe  Morellet  sur le dix-hruilieme  siecle et sur la Rcvolu- 
tioI  ([Paris, 1821], 1:  130),  Morellet emphasized, "II ne faut pas croire que dans 
cette societe [Holbach's group], toute philosophique qu'elle 6tait, . .  .  ces opinions 
libres outre mesure fussent celles de tous. Nous etions la bon nombre de th6istes, 
et  point honteux, qui nous defendions vigoureusement, mais en  aimant toujours 
des athees de si bonne compagnie." The predominance of  deism over atheism in 
the Enlightenment is stressed in  Paul Hazard, La pensee europeenene  au XVIII 
si&le: de Montesquieu a  Lessinig (Paris, 1946).  The  forthcoming work of  Alan 
Kors should give  the final blow  to  the myth about the  rampant atheism of  the 
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and the Enlightenment.">  In contrast to Gay's irresistible  "tide of  atheism" 
(2:  144), Shackleton  even sees some collaboration  between the philosophes 
and the Catholic church, not so much in France as in Spain, Portugal, and 
Italy, where Cardinal  Passionei and Benedict XIV corresponded  philosophi- 
cally with Montesquieu and Voltaire. This Mediterranean  Jansenism some- 
times protected philosophes under attack by Jansenists  in Paris, and it pro- 
vided weapons for the philosophic floggings administered  to Jesuits through- 
out the Iberian Peninsula and the Habsburg empire, two  areas that Gay 
almost completely omits from his book. The Jesuits themselves pursued mo- 
dernity while persecuting  philosophes, as a reading of the astute articles on 
science in the MW'nioires  de Trevoux would confirm.  Josephinism  and regalism 
were both enlightened  and Catholic, and the interaction  of religion and en- 
lightenment  in Protestant  countries was even more complicated, as Herbert 
Dieckmann has warned all intrepid synthesizers."  There was rnore pietism 
than atheism in the works of Kant, less Voltairian Stlurm  than spiritualistic 
Drang in the literary  revival  of Germany, and very little crushing  of l'infamne 
in Johnson's England. Gay is aware of  these nuances. He  produces some 
splendid  chapters  on Lessing and Burke and does not try to picture Jonathan 
Edwards  as Benjamin  Franklin.  But his Enlightenment  remains  that of David 
Hume, who receives  the most splendid  chapter  of all. 
The synthesis  suffers  from the same birth defects as its dialectical  brothers. 
According to Gay's formula, "modernity"  or "autonomy"  came into being 
sometime in the late eighteenth century, when the philosophes felt as free 
from the classics as they did from the Christians.  But this was also the era 
of neoclassicism,  which Hugh Honour has defined recently as "the style of 
the late eighteenth century, of  the culminating, revolutionary  phase in that 
great outburst  of human inquiry known as the Enlightenment."7  If Honour 
is correct, then Gay's synthesis belongs before his thesis, and his eighteenth 
century runs backward. If Gay is correct, it is difficult to understand  why 
expressions  of classicism like the Palais Bourbon  and the Oath of thle  Horatii 
appeared  at the end of  the eighteenth century and why manifestations of 
modernity  like the scientific  revolution8  and the dispute between the ancients 
and the moderns (which Gay does not mention) occurred at the end of the 
seventeenth. 
But Gay's synthesis suffers less from misplae-d modernity than from a 
tendency  to exaggerate  the Enlightenment's  radicalism.  For just as stage two 
of the dialectic  leads to atheism,  stage three  produces  revolution-and  reopens 
the whole question of the connection between Enlightenment  and revolution 
in the eighteenth century. Gay finds the connection fundamental, because 
5Alfred Cobban, The Eiglhteenthl  Century: Europe in the Age of the Enllighlten- 
ineltt (London,  1969),  p. 278  (see  also  Robert Shackleton, "Jansenism and the 
Enlightenment,"  Studies on Voltaire anid thle  Eighlteenthtl  Cenltury  57 [1967]: 1387- 
97). 
6 Herbert Dieckmann, "Themes and  Structure of  the  Enlightenment," Essavs 
ill Comparative  Literature (Saint Louis, 1961), pp. 67-71. 
Hugh Honour, Neo-classicism (Harmondsworth, England, 1968),  p.  13. 
8 In The Edge of Objectivity:  Ani  Essay in tlhe  History of Scienitific  Ideas (Prince- 
ton, N.J., 1960), Charles C. Gillispie sees a tendency in the scientific thought of the 
Enlightenment to  move  away  from  the  strictly scientific toward the  romantic, 
away from Newton toward Diderot and Goethe. 118  Robert Darnton 
he sets 1688 and 1789 as chronological boundaries for his book. But he 
hardly refers to  the revolutions of  England and France and concentrates 
instead on the American Revolution-the  "Finale" to  the dialectic, yet  a 
strangely  unrevolutionary  affair.  Gay does not even mention the Declaration 
of Independence,  which is usually interpreted  as the culmination of radical 
Enlightenment  in America. But he  goes into a detailed discussion of  The 
Federalist Papers, where he  finds the  omnipresent "dialectical movement 
away from Christianity  to modernity"  (2:  563).  This unorthodox emphasis 
creates  some confusion, because the most recent work by Bernard  Bailyn and 
Alan Heimert makes it more difficult than ever to  imagine the Founding 
Fathers trading impieties with  Hume and Holbach. But Gay's approach 
permits  him to scuttle natural  law, which he views as a vestigial metaphysics 
left over from the seventeenth century and progressively  eliminated in the 
eighteenth. Of course he does not deny that the American revolutionaries, 
like Montesquieu,  Voltaire,  Diderot, and Rousseau. often invoked the laws of 
nature.  But he interprets  Hume's "revolutionary"  (2: 455)  attack on natural 
law as more fundamental  to the Enlightenment  than Diderot's  "revolutionary" 
(2: 457)  defense of it. The confusion comes because almost everything the 
philosophes  did seems to have been revolutionary.  Their emphasis on man's 
natural  goodness  was "subversive,  in fact revolutionary"  (2: 398),  and "revo- 
lutionary"  was their "rehabilitation  of the passions" (2:  192).  Their "revo- 
lutionary ideology" (1:  27)  extended far and wide-to  a "revolution"  (2: 
369)  in historiography  and in the theater (Miss Sara Sampson, "a revolu- 
tionary drama" [2: 264]),  not to mention the "utterly subversive manner" 
(2: 390) in which they attacked  religion.  In art, Reynolds's  career  was "revo- 
lutionary  in its implications"  (2: 234),  although as aestheticians  Diderot and 
Lessing were "revolutionaries  who never lost their respect for tradition" (2: 
250).  The alarmed reader may be reassured  to learn that the philosophes' 
aversion to the Gothic was "no mark of  radicalism"  if  not downright "re- 
actionary" (2:  217),  and that "as a group, the philosophes were a solid, 
respectable  clan of revolutionaries"  (1: 9).  But then he discovers  that unlike 
the classicists  of the seventeenth  century, who had "concealed  their radical- 
ism" (1: 282),  the philosophes  turned classicism into "an instrument  of sub- 
version" (1: 264); and their penchant for ancient Greece "remained  subver- 
sive" (1:  75)  while "the Enlightenment  itself was moving toward overt and 
bellicose radicalism"  (1: 200).  Gay's Enlightenment  is such an explosive af- 
fair that one wonders  how the Old Regime ever got as far as 1789. The philo- 
sophes  had the place wired, mined, and booby trapped. 
But Gay's narrative does not reach 1789 either: it stops just after the 
American Revolution-rather  anticlimatically  for the reader watching the 
pressure  rise toward the big bang. Nonetheless, The  Federalist makes a good 
if somewhat unrevolutionary  point to call a halt on all the radicalizing  and 
undermining,  because not only was the  Enlightenment's  influence on  the 
French Revolution problematical,  but Gay had argued in an earlier article 
that it was relatively  unimportant.9  He had to dispose of his Humean, Hol- 
bachean  explosives  somewhere;  so he dumped them on the United States. An 
easier solution, however, would have been to delete "revolutionary"  from its 
myriad appearances  in the text and to  admit that the Enlightenment was 
9 Peter Gay,  "Rhetoric and  Politics  in  the  French Revolution," reprinted in 
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a pretty mild affair after all. By  1778, when all of  Paris was salaaming  before 
Voltaire,  the  last  generation  of  philosophes  had  become  pensioned,  petted, 
and completely  integrated  in high society.  Ten  years  later men  like  Morellet 
and  Dupont  labored  valiantly  to  prevent  the  collapse  of  the  Old  Regime, 
as was perfectly  natural, for the High Enlightenment  was one  of  its most  im- 
portant potential props. Quesnay, Turgot, and even Voltaire offered a program 
of liberal reform, a possibility  of perpetuating the social  order by blunting its 
conflicts.  The  idea of  subverting  society,  if  it ever  occurred  to  them,  would 
have struck them as monstrous.  Not  only  did they  believe  in the basic  struc- 
ture of  the  Old  Regime,  they  thought  that  it  ought  to  remain  hierarchical. 
As d'Alembert explained:  "Is a great effort of  philosophy  necessary  to under- 
stand that in society,  and especially  in a large state, it is indispensable to have 
rank defined by clear distinctions,  that if virtue and talent alone have  a claim 
to  our  true  homage,  the  superiority  of  birth  and  eminence  commands  our 
deference  and our respect?""1' With exceptions  like Rousseau,  the philosophes 
were  elitists.  They  enlightened  through  noblesse  oblige  in  company  with 
noblemen,  and often  with a patronizing  attitude toward the bourgeois  as well 
as the common  people.  In the article "Go'ut" of  his  Dictionnaire  philosophli- 
qie,  Voltaire  observed,  "Taste  is thus  like  philosophy;  it  belongs  to  a  very 
small  number of  privileged  souls,  .  .  .  It  is  unknown  in  bourgeois  families, 
where one is continually  occupied  with the care of one's fortune."  It has been 
argued  recently  that,  far  from  rising  with  the  middle  class,  liberalism  de- 
scended  from  a  long  line  of  aristocrats,  and  so  did  the  Enlightenment.'1 
Except  for  men  like  Condorcet,  the  last  of  the  philosophes  fit  in  perfectly 
with the Sevres porcelain  and chlinoiserie  of  the  salons;  the  High  Enlighten- 
ment served as frosting for France's thin and crumbling upper crust. 
If there was  any  "radicalism" among  the  abbes  and petits  marquis  of  the 
synthetic  Enlightenment,  it was  their  faith  in  natural  law,  the  very  weapon 
that Gay excludes  from  his overstocked  arsenal of  revolutionary  philosophy. 
The abbe Raynal, who  lived  to bewail  the advent  of  the  Revolution,  polemi- 
cized against slavery because he considered  it contrary to the law of  nature- 
and this was not  innocuous  humanitarianism,  because  powerful  interests  fed 
on  slavery,  as  the  Amis  des  noirs  were  to  learn  when  they  tangled  with 
the Club Massaic during the Revolution.  The philosophes  justified many other 
items in their "program," as Gay  calls  it in his  account  of  their reform  cam- 
paigns,  by  reference  to  what  they  considered  as  eternal,  immutable  values. 
Gay  interprets these  references  as  rhetoric.  Like  Alfred  Cobban,12 he  em- 
phasizes the strain of  utilitarianism  in the writings of  Holbach,  Beccaria,  and 
Bentham  and  treats  Hume's  attack  on  normative  reasoning  as  the  turning 
point in eighteenth-century  thought.  But what Hume killed with logic  lived on 
10 D'Alembert,  Histoire  des  membles  de  l'Academie  fran!caise morts  depuis  1700 
ju(sqII'eii  1771  (Paris,  1787),  1:  xxxii. 
11  For the Marxist view of  a  bourgeois Enlightenment, see Lucien Goldmann, 
"La pensee  des  'Lumieres,'"  A irnales: economies,  societes,  civilisationis  22  (1967): 
752-70.  On aristocratic liberalism, see  Denis  Richet, "Autour des origines id6o- 
logiques  lointaines  de  la  R6volution  francaise:  6lites  et  despotisme,"  AnIniales: 
(econlomhies,  societes,  cilvilisationis  24  (1969):  1-23.  Jacques  Proust,  Diderot  et 
1'EiicyclopMdie (Paris,  1962),  contains  a  sophisticated  version  of  the  old  issue  of 
the  Enlightenment's  character  as  "revolutionary"  ideology. 
12 Alfred  Cobban,  In  Searchl of  Humaniitv:  The  Role  of  thle Enilighltetnmeiit in 
Modernl History  (New  York,  1960),  p.  3. 120  Robert Darnton 
in the  hearts  and  minds  of  most  philosophes;  and  Hume,  despite  Gay's  in- 
genious  revisionist interpretation of him, remained a very Tory  revolutionary. 
Why not  admit that natural law,  codified  in  influential  textbooks  like  Burla- 
maqui's Principes  du  droit  naturel,  survived  throughout  the  Enlightenn3ent 
in contradiction to strict empiricism, utilitarianism, and Hume's lethal surgery? 
Philosophy  thrives  on  contradictions.  In  fact  there  was  a built-in  contradic- 
tion  between  the  descriptive  and  prescriptive  aspects  of  natural  law  itself. 
The  philosophes  were  forever  attempting  to  bring  the  physical  and  moral 
worlds  together  and  to  seek  spiritual  uplift  in  the  Spacious  Firmament  on 
High. This  tension  between  the  normative  and the  material  is what  gave  the 
Enlightenment  life.  It  is fully  appreciated  in  classical  studies  like  Cassirer's 
The  Philosophy  of  the  Enlightenment,  Hazard's  European  7'hought  in  the 
Eighteenthl Century,  and-for  all Gay's  efforts  to  expunge  it-Becker's  The 
Heavenly  City of the Eighteentlr-Century Philosophers. 
The  final dimension  of  Gay's  dialectic  is psychological.  It, too,  includes  a 
revolution:  the emergence  of  a new personality  type-autonomous,  demysti- 
fied, modern man. Psychological  modernity,  Gay  argues, came  about through 
a  collective  identity  crisis  among  the  philosophes.  To  be  sure,  an  identity 
crisis on top of a dialectic  makes for problems,  but Gay does not shrink from 
an  explicitly  Eriksonian  attack  on  them.  His  bibliography  contains  three 
generous pages  of  acknowledgment  of  works  on  psychoanalysis  and sex  that 
he found  helpful,  beginning  with  Erikson-or  rather beginning  with  the  be- 
ginning:  "In my  view  of  sexuality,  both  its meaning  and  its  history,  I  have 
been  guided  by  Freud"  (2:  628).  It  may  be  that  Erikson  is  feeling  over- 
acknowledged  these days (he has been heard to mutter unhappily  about learn- 
ing  of  an  identity  crisis  in  men's  wear),  but  Gay  does  not  use  the  magic 
formula frivolously.  He argues that the struggle against Christianity produced 
an identity crisis in the entire family  of  philosophes  and that they  were  able 
to resolve  it because  "it was precisely  the growth of  the superego  in Western 
culture  that  made  greater  sexual  freedom  possible"  (2:  204-5).  Thus  the 
dialectic  of  ancients,  Christians,  and  philosophes  apparently  corresponded 
in some way to a three-cornered fight between  the id, ego,  and superego;  and 
"the Enlightenment  is the great rebellion of  the ego  against irrational author- 
ity"  (1:  462).  This  interpretation,  however,  raises problems  for  the  faithful 
Eriksonian reader who  had been assured by the master that "the Renaissance 
is the  ego  revolution  par  excellence."13  The  problems  are  compounded  by 
Gay's  assertion  that  "the sexual  ideal  of  the  Enlightenment  may  be  said  to 
have been the genital personality"  (2:  628).  Did  some  subdialectic  synthesize 
orality and anality into  genitality?  If the philosophes  reached  such  advanced 
modernity in the eighteenth  century, where is "Western culture" today? Poly- 
morphous perversion presumably. 
Would it not be easier to give up the subdialectics,  reversed antitheses,  and 
entangled syntheses  and to admit that the only  dialectic  in history  is historio- 
graphical:  the dialectic  between  those  who  get  it right  and those  who  get  it 
written? In this  case,  alas,  the  written  version  is  wrong:  the  Enlightenment 
was not a dialectical struggle for autonomy. 
If one  abandons Gay's dialectic,  what is left  of  his social  history  of  ideas? 
Its feasibility  can  best  be  measured  by  considering  Gay's  treatment  of  two 
final problems: the relation of  the Enlightenment  to  sociopolitical  issues  and 
1- Erik H. Erikson, Young Mati Luther:  A Study  in Psyclioanalvsis  anld Hfistory, 
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to the spread  of literacy. Both will be discussed in the context of French his- 
tory, so that Gay's interpretation  can be compared  with the findings in Livre 
et societe',  a book that belongs to the mainstream  of advanced  French histori- 
ography. The advance has occurred most spectacularly  in the study of  the 
Old Regime's social structure and has already reached the textbook stage. 
The uninitiate  therefore  need not read every word in the overwhelming  tomes 
of Pierre  Goubert, Emmanuel  Le Roy Ladurie,  Pierre de Saint-Jacob,  Roger 
Dion, Rene Baehrel, Abel Poitrineau,  Paul Bois, Frangois Bluche, and Jean 
Meyer. They can consult the brief and brilliant popularizations  written by 
Pierre Goubert and Robert Mandrou,14  and there they will see that Gay is 
wrong to reduce the main sociopolitical issues of the eighteenth century to a 
dualism, pitting the these nobilijaire  (the reactionary  cause championed by 
the parlements  and Montesquieu) against the these royale (the progressive 
cause of royal reformers  and Voltaire). The Old Regime was too complicated 
to be classified  so simply, and Voltaire's  propaganda  was too simplistic to be 
"good history always and good politics for decades" (2:  483).  Contrary to 
what Gay maintains,  the privileged  orders paid important  sums in taxation, 
and privilege  was not consonant with "order"  in any case: it ate through all 
levels of society, down to the very peasantry.15  In defending privilege, the 
parlements  did not so much defend the nobility as protect a complex combi- 
nation of vested interests typical of  traditional  societies. Their defense had 
a wide enough appeal to make their "liberal"  rhetoric something more than 
hypocritical.  By the end of the century,  they were not the closed, caste-ridden 
bodies Gay describes.1"  In fact, contrary  to what Gay suggests,  Turgot favored 
their recall in 1774, and Montesquieu's  sympathy for them did not amount 
to a reactionary  ideology. Voltaire was a sincere reformer  but no great enemy 
of privilege:  he was an annobli, courtier,  grand  seigneur, and proud possessor 
of a coat of arms  with a fake marquis's  crown. 
The attack on privilege came less from Ferney than from such unphilo- 
sophic quarters as the chancellery and the Controle general. Consider the 
opinion of Charles Frangois Lebrun, who epitomizes a tradition of bureau- 
cratic reform that shaped policy during  Maupeou's  attack on the parlements: 
"I did not want to enlist with the philosophes ...  I would have preferred  to 
see them devote their energies to a field other than the one they had chosen 
[i.e., the campaign  against  the church?].  It seemed to me that the government 
could make them into useful auxiliaries in the fields of  administration  and 
internal  politics, could direct  their attacks  against  the barriers  which separated 
province from province, against privileges which placed uneven burdens on 
the people, against numberless  contradictory  customary laws, against the di- 
versity  of legal systems, against  courts which were distant and inaccessible  to 
people bringing suit, against usurped jurisdictions, against that swarm of 
14  Pierre  Goubert,  L'Aniciei  Regime  (Paris,  1969);  Robert  Mandrou.  La 
Franice  aiux  XVIJJ  et XVIIIJ siecles (Paris, 1967). 
15See  Goubert, chap. 7; and C. B. A.  Behrens, "Nobles, Privileg,es  and Taxes 
in France at the End of the Ancien Regime," Ecoiomic- HistorY  Reviei,  2d ser.. 
no. 3 (1963). 
16The  complex question of  the sociopolitical character-  of  the parlemiienits  has 
not yet  been settled, despite the  important theses of  Frani,ois Bluche and Jeani 
Meyer. But the work of  Jean Egret has at least dented the standard interpreta- 
tion of  a  late eighteenth-century "revolte nobiliaire" (see  Egret,  "L'aristocratie 
parlementaire frangaise a  la  fin  de  l'Ancien  R6gime," Revulle  Iiistori-iqiu 208 
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guilds which hindered industry and stopped its progress. In every part of 
France there were reforms to carry out, p2ople to be enlightened."'7,  How 
much did the reform movement owe to the Enlightenment?  Far more, no 
doubt, than Lebrun acknowledged,  but far less than is maintained  by most 
intellectual  historians.  Administrative  history, rather  than philosophic  theory, 
might  be the place to look for the real thrust  behind reformism.  Many of the 
reforms  decreed by the Revolution were drafted in the baroque bureaucracy 
of Louis XIV, as is illustrated  in The Single  Duty  Project  by J. F.  Bosher, 
an excellent, unintended example of  the social history of  ideas. The  Old 
Regime left enough of its red tape behind. Why not go to the archives and 
get wrapped  up in it, instead of reading Voltaire, if one wants to learn how 
ideas and politics tangled in the eighteenth century?  What is true of France 
applies even more to the rest of Europe. where "enlightened  absolutism,"  as 
Gay astutely characterizes  it, had little relation to the Enlightenment.  Most 
sovereigns  reformed in order to maximize power. They reformed with cam- 
eralists, not philosophes,  drawing  on a tradition  of bureaucratic  rationalizing 
that went back to the seventeenth,  and sometimes  the sixteenth,  century. 
The problems of  measuring literacy and reading habits, which have at- 
tracted  the heaviest research  by the Livre et societe  group, receive somewhat 
summary  treatment  by Gay: "In France (to judge from signatures  on mar- 
riage  certificates)  the percentage  of literate  adults rose from about four in ten 
in 1680 to more than seven in ten a century later" (2:  58).  Where Gay got 
this information  is difficult  to say, because his book is as short on footnotes 
as it is long on bibliography.  The only historical study of literacy that covers 
the entire country (the survey directed by Louis Maggiolo in the  1870s) 
estimates  that 21 percent  of all French adults could sign marriage  certificates 
in 1686-90, 37 percent  in 1786-90, and 72 percent in 1871-75.  1 
Important  consequences result from this apparent  confusion of  the eigh- 
teenth and the nineteenth  ccnturies, because, as Gay says, "The first precon- 
dition for a flourishing  republic  of letters  was a wide reading  public" (2: 58). 
Believing  that literacy  soared  to 70 percent, he concludes  that the philosophes 
acquired a "new audience" (2:  61),  increased prosperity, improved status, 
and relative freedom from patronage. These conditions not only made the 
Enlightenment  possible  but transformed  it into a revolutionary  force, for Gay 
never drops the theme of  radicalization: "[T]he growing radicalism and 
increasing  freedom of the Enlightenment  reflected  and produced irreversible, 
if often subterranean,  changes in Western  politics, economy, and society. As 
democrats  and atheists took the lead in the family of philosophes, radicals 
rebelled against constituted authority all over the Western world" (2:  83). 
This statement  comes closer to describing  France at the time of the Commune 
than the France of Voltaire. 
Voltaire's  France  creates  enormous  problems  for the social history of ideas, 
because the mental world of its inhabitants  did not extend very far beyond 
17 Lebrun's autobiography, as translated in the anthology of  readings edited by 
John Rothney. The  Brittaln  Af fair  atndl thle Crisis  of  the  Ancien  RWgime (New 
York, 1969), p. 243. 
"I Michel Fleury and Pierre Valmary, "Les progres de l'instruction e6lmentaire 
de Louis XIV  a Napol6on  III," Populationi,  no.  1  (1957),  pp. 71-92.  Gay  also 
associates the philosophes with a  "linguistic revolution" (2:  60):  the shift from 
Latin to  French as  the  dominant language in  which  books  were  published in 
France. Here his source seems to be  David  Pottinger, Tile  French Book  Trade 
in the Anicietn Regime, 1500-1791  (Cambridge, Mass., 1958).  Pottinger, however, In Search of the Enlightenment  123 
the boundaries  of their social world-beyond  the guild, the parish assembly, 
the regional units of administrative,  legal, commercial, and religious institu- 
tions;  beyond  local ways of weighing,  measuring,  and paying for commodities; 
and beyond provincial techniques of  raising children, dressing, and talking. 
Most Frenchmen  probably  did not speak French during  Voltaire's  childhood. 
By the time of his death ( 1778),  improved roadways and demographic  and 
economic expansion had brought the country together. But France did not 
cohere as a nation until after the Revolutionary  and Napoleonic periods. To 
understand  how the Enlightenment  "took" in such a fragmented society is 
no easier than to measure  its influence  on a European  scale. Perhaps it never 
penetrated  far below the elite in any area of eighteenth-century  Europe. 
It is the elite that interests  Gay, so he should not be expected to produce 
a parish-by-parish  sociological analysis. The elite shared a common, cosmo- 
politan culture. Nevertheless, to be a philosophe in Poland was a different 
experience  than to be a philosophe in England. Gay tries to explain the dif- 
ferences  by relating  them to forces outside the philosophic "family,"  and this 
attempt makes him stumble on  the complexities of  social history. To  take 
the example of literacy  again, Gay's interpretation  might be rescued  by argu- 
ing that literacy is only important as a precondition for the growth of  a 
reading  public large enough to support a population  of writers  living entirely 
from their pens. Thus the crucial factor is that the total number of French 
readers increased, owing to  population growth, although the incidence of 
literacy remained  below the level of "modern"  societies. Furthermore,  adult 
miaile  literacy  went up significantly  (from 29 percent  in 1686-90 to 47 percent 
in 1786-90, using  signatures  of marriage  certificates  as an index), and certain 
areas, particularly  in the nortlheast,  reached levels of  80 percent. In fact, 
a sort of literacy barrier or Maggiolo line ran from Mont Saint-Michel to 
Besanqon  or Geneva, separating  the north, where literacy was always above 
25 percent, from the south, where the rate was usually under 25 percent.19 
But given this limited,  regional  growth  of the reading  public, another  question 
arises: Did the new readers  create a new literary market, freeing the philo- 
sophes from patronage  and thereby radicalizing  the Enlightenment?  If Dide- 
rot's Lettre sur le conmmtierce  de librairie, Malesherbes's  Memoires sur la li- 
brairie,  and the royal edicts on the book trade are to be believed, the answer 
to that question is no. And if the pension lists in the Archives Nationales 
indicate trends in patronage, the state subsidized writers in the traditional 
manner  under  Louis XVI, and may have subsidized  more of them than in the 
days of Louis XIV. The publishing  industry  did not reach a "takeoff"  point 
until the development  of the steam press, cheap techniques of manufacturing 
paper, and mass education in the nineteenth century. Increased literacy did 
not liberate the philosophes any more than the philosophes revolutionized 
society. 
Actually, Gay backs away from some of his statements  about literacy and 
revolutionizing  by the end of the book. Thus the new phenomenon of mass 
literacy, which he announces at the beginning, declines as the dialectic un- 
folds, until in the end, "the overpowering  presence of the illiterate masses" 
(2: 492) saps the philosophes'  revolutionary  ardor.  Driven by "a sense of de- 
places this "revolution"  well before the Enlightenment. Of the books he examined, 
62 percent  were published  in Latin in 1500-1509, 29 percent in 1590-1599, 7 percent 
in 1690-1699, and 5 percent in 1790-91 (p. 18). 
19 See Fleury and Valmary. 124  Robert Darnton 
spair at the general  wretchedness,  illiteracy, and brutishness  of the poor" (2: 
517), the philosophes  begin to mutter  about canaille, to flirt with enlightened 
absolutism, and to entertain ideas of  a  repressive, obscurantist "social re- 
ligion" (2: 522). All's well that ends well. Saved from error  by inconsistency, 
we are left in an eighteenth  century  we can recognize. 
Gay's Enlightenment  remains  recognizable,  despite the confusion of its dia- 
lectic, because it covers familiar territory with a refreshing sense of  redis- 
covery. Instead  of striking  for the frontier,  Gay set out to clear a path through 
the monographs cluttering eighteenth-century  historiography, and he  suc- 
ceeded where his dialectic failed. Following him is like touring with a Guide 
Michelin:  one stops for the occasional  degustation  but never wanders  far from 
the three-star  routes. In the end, the verdict is clear: Gay's Enlightenment 
"vaut le voyage." But it is most valuable as one man's summing up, a syn- 
thesis of years of thoughtful reading, which one instinctively places on the 
shelf next to R. R. Palmer's The Age of the Democratic Revolution. Taken 
as a synthesis  of social history and the history of ideas, however, it does not 
hold up because  it will not stand without its dialectical  scaffolding. 
1I 
It may be misleading to compare Gay's polished synthesis with the mono- 
graphic articles published in Livre et societe. But the two works share a 
concern for what the Livre et societe group sometimes refers to as "l'histoire 
sociale des idees," and the comparison  is revealing  because the French begin 
by resisting  the urge to synthesize.  In a way, they locate the Enlightenment  by 
not looking for it: instead, they put aside preconceptions  about the "philo- 
sophie des lumieres"  and seek out the unenlightened,  the everyday, and the 
average. Their purpose is to reconstruct  literary culture as it actually was. 
They therefore  emphasize  intellectual  "inertia"  and try to measure the depth 
of tradition,  adopting  an approach  that had lain fallow since Daniel Mornet 
first  experimented  with it a half-century  earlier. 
While Cassirer was exploring the phenomenology of  the Enlightenment 
mind, Mornet  studied the Enlightenment  as a social process. And while other 
literary  scholars  pondered  the eighteenth  century's  great books, Mornet exam- 
ined the means by which ideas diffused  downward  in society. His examination 
revealed that some books, which later ages took to be great, may not have 
been widely read under the Old Regime,2')  and this revelation raised a new 
set of questions: What did eighteenth-century  Frenchmen read? And what 
was the balance of tradition and innovation in early modern book culture? 
Mornet  left these questions  to his descendants  in the Vle Section of the Ecole 
Pratique  des Hautes Etudes,  and especially  to the research  team that produced 
Livre et socite.  The researchers  also inherited  the techniques and traditions 
of  the "Annales"  school, which inclined them toward the study of  "men- 
talites"  rather  than formal philosophic ideas and which made them receptive 
to the quantitative  methods  that Mornet had developed. 
Owing  to the complexity  of the Old Regime and the diversity  of its culture, 
the Livre et societe group tried to relate the literary and social life of eigh- 
teenth-century  France by studying specific milieux: the obscure masses who 
"read"  or listened to popular literature,  the educated provincials who pur- 
20  Daniel Mornet, "Les enseignements des bibliotheques priv6es (1750-1780)," 
Revue  d'hlistoire  litiraire tie la Franice  17 (1910):  449-92. In Search of the Enlightenment  125 
chased traditional  works, the elite of the provincial academies, and the Pa- 
risians  who produced  and consumed  certain  "advanced"  periodicals. 
The work done on the first of these four groups makes the most exciting 
reading,  because it gives one a sense of contact with the remote mental uni- 
verse of the eighteenth-century  village. Robert Mandrou showed that such 
contact was possible in De  la culture populaire  aux  17c  et 18e siecles  (Paris, 
1964),  a brief but brilliant study of  the crude paperbacks known as the 
Bibliotheque  bleue, which colporters  hawked through the countryside, along 
with thread and cutlery, from the seventeenth to  the nineteenth century. 
Printed  on cheap paper  with wornout type, sold for a sou, and read until they 
fell apart,  these little books contain clues to a popular culture that is other- 
wise more inaccessible  than the civilization inscribed on Cleopatra's  Needle. 
They were read aloud by the few villagers  who could read during the veillee, 
an informal  evening get-together  where women sewed and men repaired  tools. 
The Bibliotheque  bleue certainly belonged to a humble level of culture. Its 
stories often begin, "As you are about to hear....  But what message was 
communicated  by this oral-written  genre, and how did these books relate to 
the culture of the upper strata?  Mandrou placed them far behind and below 
the Enlightenment.  He showed that while the philosophes  were stressing the 
rationality  and sensibilite  of human nature, the Bibliotheque  bleue presented 
man as a slave of passion, driven by astrological  forces and weird mixtures 
of the four humors and the four elements. While the freethinkers  were natu- 
ralizing religion, the Bibliotheque  bleue purveyed spiritualism,  miracles, and 
hagiography.  And while the scientists  were emptying  the universe  of mystery, 
the Bibliotheque bleue filled the heads of  its reader-listeners  with visions 
of threatening,  occult forces, which could be appeased  by mumbo-jumbo  and 
deciphered  with recipe-knowledge-magic numbers,  physiognomy,  and primi- 
tive rituals. As literature,  the Bibliotheque  bleue adapted and simplified the 
medieval tales and Gaulois humor that polite society rejected in the seven- 
teenth century. So Mandrou concluded that in comparison with the culture 
of the elite, the popular culture represented  by the Bibliotheque  bleue was 
both distinct and derivative. He went on  to  hypothesize that the popular 
literature  of the Old Regime served as an ideological substitute  for class con- 
sciousness  among the masses. The peasants  let their thoughts  wander through 
a wonderland  inhabited  by Robert le diable, Oger le danois, Pierre de Pro- 
vence, the giant Fierabras,  and all manner  of magical forces, instead  of taking 
the measure  of the real world of toil and exploitation. 
Mandrou's  study, a product of the "Annales"  school but not of the Livre 
et societe group, prepared  the way for the work of Genevieve Bolleme, who 
produced a general survey of the Bibliotheque  bleue for volume 1 of  Livre 
et societe and a detailed study of popular almanacs,  which grew too big for 
volume 2  and was published as a separate monograph. Bolleme's analysis 
confirmed  the main lines of Mandrou's  but emphasized change rather than 
continuity  in the evolution of popular literature.  She found that the escapism 
and supernaturalism  of  the seventeenth century receded in  the eighteenth 
with the influx of  new attitudes: a more worldly and realistic orientation 
toward death, human nature, social relations, and natural forces. The old 
astrology  and mythical tales gave way to a new sense of science and history. 
A new "morale  sociale," an "esprit  critique,"'1  and an awareness  of current 
21 Genevieve  Bolleme,  Les almnaniaclhs  populaires aux XV!!  et XV!!!" siwcles: 
Essai d'liistoire sociale  (Paris,  1969), p. 84. 126  Robert Darnton 
events indicated  the penetration  not merely  of  the Enlightenment  but also  of 
incipient revolutionary ideas.''  Despite  their similarities, therefore,  the studies 
of  Mandrou  and  Bolleme  point  in  opposite  directions,  the  first  toward  the 
separation  of  cultural  worlds  and the  intellectual  enserfment  of  the  masses, 
the second  toward an increase  in cultural  integration,  with  popular  literature 
acting as a liberating force. 
It is too early to tell which view will prevail because  there has not yet been 
enough  detailed  study  of  the  many  genres  of  popular  literature.  Bolleme's 
work is more detailed,  as it concentrates  on one  genre-the  popular  almanac 
-whose  development  can be traced with  some  precision  through  the  seven- 
teenth and eighteenth  centuries.  But the attempt to be precise  about the  cos- 
mology of the common  man raises methodological  problems that did not ham- 
per  Mandrou's  more  general  and  impressionistic  work.  For  not  only  did 
Bolleme  move  beyond  general  impressions,  she  attempted  to enter  right into 
the minds of  the  almanacs'  reader-listeners,  and there  she  found  not  merely 
mumbo-jumbo  but  "Kantian"23  categories.  The  categories-"observations 
astrales perpetuelles,"24 for example-do  not summon up the Critique of Pure 
Reason. Instead, they arouse skepticism: Do  the almanacs reveal the workings 
of  the popular mind, or is this upside-down  Cassirer? Bolleme  did not  prove 
the "popular" character of her almanacs.  On the contrary,  she drew material 
from some  almanacs in bindings with  aristocratic coats  of  arms; from  others 
that  expressed  scorn  for  "les prejuges  populaires";25  and  from  several  that 
did  not  aim their  aphorisms  at the  illiterate  or  the  indigent:  "Lis souvent"; 
"Achete des livres en tout temps"; "Ne  tyrannisez  point  le pauvre  debiteur"; 
"Peragit tranquilla potestas quod violenta  requit."126  Poor  Richard  (a  favorite 
in France)  belonged  in part to  the lost,  aristocratic world  of  Thomas  Jeffer- 
son. There were almanacs for everyone,  even  in the upper reaches of  the Old 
Regime.  Bolleme  acknowledged  the differences  among  the  almanacs  but she 
grouped them all together for the purpose of analysis. And  when  she analyzed 
changes  in the world  view  of  the eighteenth-century  populace  she  based  her 
conclusions  almost  entirely  on  a sampling  of  only  twenty-seven  undifferen- 
tiated almanacs. The  almanac  upon which  she relied most heavily  and which 
she cited most often as evidence  of  advanced opinion  at the popular level was 
Le  messager  boiteux,  a  work  printed  in  Bern,  Bale,  Yverdon,  Vevey,  and 
Neuchatel-that  is, by Swiss  and in some  instances  by  Protestants:  not  a re- 
liable index to the attitudes of Catholic French peasants.27 
But how  reliable  are the  most  folksy  and  most  French  of  the  almanacs? 
Frequently  presented  as  the  aphorisms  of  one  shepherd  ("le  Grand  Berger 
de la Montagne")  addressing others, they have  more of  the flavor of  Renais- 
sance pastoralism than of  a genuine  shepherd-to-shepherd  dialogue.  The  pas- 
toralism  may  have  been  adapted  for  mass  consumption  from  the  "model" 
22  See esp. ibid., pp. 123-24,  16, and 55. 
2" Ibid., p. 95.  24  Ibid., p. 98.  2  5 Ibid.,  p. 131. 
2 ; Ibid. (in order of citation) pp. 74, 79, 75, and 81. 
27  The  versions published in  Yverdon  and  Vevey  by  Jeanne-Esther Bondeli 
and Paul-Abraham Chenebie derived from the Hiuickenide Bote of  Berii, a Ger- 
man almanac produced by  Emmanuel Hortiti, the son  of  a  Protestant minister 
(see  Jules  Capr6, Histoire  du  lveritable  messages-  boiteux  de  Bet-te  et  Vev'ey 
[Vevey,  1884] and  Jeanne-Pierre Perret. Les  imprimeries  d'Yverdotn  au  XVIIC 
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almanac  of the fifteenth century, Le grantd  compost des bergers,  but the rhe- 
torical  pose  might  have  had  more  in  common  with  the  masquerading  of 
Marie-Antoinette  than  the mountainsidle egalitarianism  detected  by  Boll'eme. 
The  almanacs  represent a popularization  of  upper-class  culture,  not  popular 
culture in itself,  because  they were written for the people,  not  by the people, 
and they were not so much  "written" as adapted  in the  most  casual  fashion, 
sometimes  even  by  typesetters,  from  the  literature  of  the  elite.  The  great 
problem  is not  to  extract  their  message,  but  to  know  whether  that  message 
was integrated in the indigenous culture of the masses. 
Mandrou  believed  it was.  The  real  dialogue,  in  his  view,  did  not  involve 
shepherds but publishers and colporters.  The  wandering  salesmen  knew  what 
the peasants would  buy  and stocked  up  accordingly,  thereby  determining,  in 
the long run, what the publishers produced.  This  argument seems  convincing, 
but it applies more  aptly to upper-class  literature, which  was  far more  sensi- 
tive to changes in styles  and ideas than was the extremely  standardized  reper- 
tory of the Bibliotheque  bleue.  Unlike  the educated  elite,  villagers  may  have 
been  passive  consumers  of  literature;  they  may  have  bought  whatever  was 
available, just because  they  wanted  something-it  hardly  mattered  what-to 
submit to the veillee reader or to stare at themselves.  As  Bolleme  put it, there 
could  have been an element  of  "magic,"'  2  a mystical  respect for the word,  in 
primitive  reading-an  obscure  psychological  process  that probably  had  little 
relation  to  the  sophisticated  reading  and  consumer  control  that  went  on  in 
high society.  So changes  in popular  literature could  have been  imposed  from 
above without  being  assimilated  at the village  level.  The  actual  culture(s)  of 
France's heterogeneous  masses remains lost in an unfathomable  ocean  of oral 
tradition; the books  that dropped  into it probably  disappeared  without  much 
effect, like missionaries  in India. 
Although  the work of Mandrou  and Bolleme  may have  failed to define the 
popular culture of eighteenth-century  France,  it enormously  enriches  the con- 
ventional  view  of  the "Age of  Reason."  By revealing  the  existence  and char- 
acter of  a vast literature that circulated  on  levels  far  below  the  philosophes, 
it helps place the Enlightenment  in perspective.  This  attempt to  define  levels 
of cultural experience  and to relate reading to specific social sectors is also the 
strong  point  of  the  other  essays  in  Livre  et  soc0te,  especially  the  study  of 
provincial  reading  by  Julien  Brancolini  and  Marie-Therese  Bouyssy.  After 
examining book consumption  in the provinces  by gc-nre and by  region,  Bran- 
colini  and  Bouyssy  concluded  that  educated  provincials  were  about  as  far 
removed  from  the  Enlightenment  as  illiterate  peasants.  The  weight  of  tra- 
ditional culture crushed innovation  in town  and village  alike. 
The  Brancolini-Bouyssy  study  was  based on  a quantitative  analysis  of  the 
records of requests by provincial  publishers for permissions  simples,  a kind of 
authorization  to  produce  works  that  had  fallen  into  the  public  domain  by 
virtue  of  legislation  reforming  the  book  trade  in  1777.  These  requests  in- 
cluded the projected number of copies  for each edition,  so they provide  more 
precise  information  than  any  of  the  sources  consulted  in  previous  attempts 
to chart the boundaries  of  literary culture  in the  Old  Regime.  The  most  im- 
portant of  these  attempts  was  published  by  Franqois  Furet  in  volume  1  of 
Livre  et socie'te. It  indicated  that  an  enormous  quantity  of  religious  works 
and  pre-eighteenth-century  "classics"  all  but  smothered  the  Enlightenment, 
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although the production  of scientific books and secular fiction increased at 
the expense of religious literature  as the century progressed.  Furet's findings 
derived  from quantitative  analysis  of requests  for privileges (strictly legal au- 
thorizations  to publish)  and  permnissions  ta(ites  (more  flexible  and  less  for- 
mally legal authorizations). But they lacked data on the size of editions and 
the places where the books were marketed.  Brancolini  and Bouyssy provided 
precisely that information, thereby supplementing and confirming Furet's 
analysis. Taken together, the  two  studies suggest that  cultural "inertia" 
weighed  heavily on all of France and that the inroads  of "innovation"  did not 
penetrate  far beyond Paris. Not a surprising  pattern-unless  it is measured 
against the conclusions of  Genevieve Bolleme. For she saw modernization 
galloping  full tilt through the crude almanacs of the late eighteenth century, 
while Brancolini and Bouyssy found nothing but cultural stagnation at  a 
more sophisticated  level of literature.  Did the literary  experience of the elite 
and of the masses somehow converge without meeting on the middle ground 
of the middle classes? 
This paradox, like so many of the problems in quantitative  history, may 
arise from insufficiencies  in the data. Requests for  permissions  simples  do not 
represent  the "vie provinciale du livre," as Brancolini and Bouyssy claim, 
because  the permnissions  simples  excluded  probably  the  most  important  com- 
ponent in the stock of provincial bookdealers: books acquired by purchases 
or, more often, by exchanges measured in page gatherings  with publishers 
located in other regions or other countries. The pcrmissions  suinples also ex- 
cluded all books published  in France under  pernmissions  tayites, the legal loop- 
hole through which much of  the Enlightenment  reached French readers.2!3 
In fact, the permissions  simnples  covered primarily a specialized and unrep- 
resentative  segment of the provincial  book trade: the relatively  stable market 
for schoolbooks  and religious  works. With the expiration  of old privileges,  the 
provincial publishers supplied new editions of  old books to local teachers, 
priests, and teacher-priests.  But they might have supplied other readers  with 
an equal number of  "advanced"  works, which could not have appeared in 
the Brancolini-Bouyssy  data. 
Although the data fail to prove the backwardness  of  provincial culture, 
they do provide a very revealing picture of  regional variations in French 
reading. They show that book production corresponded  with the incidence 
of literacy as measured  by the Maggiolo study mentioned above. The great 
majority of permissioni-simple books circulated north of  the Maggiolo line. 
Moreover,  the north's areas of highest literacy and highest book production, 
like Lorraine  and Normandy,  were areas where the Counter  Reformation  had 
been  most effective and  where nineteenth- and  twentieth-century voters 
showed most attachment to the church. Northern readers tended to  favor 
the religious "classics"  of the seventeenth  century and even Jansenist  works, 
while southerners,  especially around  Toulouse, read a relatively  high propor- 
tion of secular literature.  A series of maps illustrates  the point in rich detail. 
So despite the limitations imposed by its data, the Brancolini-Bouyssy  study 
suggests some of the complexities and the long-term trends in the cultural 
history  of France. 
211 For details on  the permi.issions simples, see  the text of  the edict of  August 
30.  1777 in Jourdan, Decrusy, and Isambert, eds., Reciueil  geti5ral  des anciennies 
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Daniel Roche's  monographs  on provincial  academies,  published  in volumes 
1 and 2 of Livre et societe, analyze the character  of the intellectual elite in 
the areas where Brancolini  and Bouyssy tried to provide an overall measure- 
ment of literary  culture. Like all elite studies, Roche's investigation  compen- 
sates in specificity for what it lacks in generality;  but here the specifics of 
quantitative analysis have important general implications, for  they define 
some of the milieux through  which the diffusion  of 'lumieres" was refracted. 
Taking a cue from Mornet, who had stressed  the importance  of studying the 
provincial  academies  in Les origines  intellectluelles  de la Re'voliution  fran(!aise, 
Roche began  with an analysis  of th- academies'  social composition.  By adopt- 
ing a carefully nuanced  classification  scheme, he reduced such abstract  prob- 
lems as the supposedly "bourgeois"  character  of the Enlightenment  to man- 
ageable proportions. He  found that the membership of  the  academies of 
Bordeaux,  Dijon, and Chalons-sur-Marne  corresponded  to the hierarchies  of 
provincial  society. The landed aristocracy,  service nobility, and (especially in 
the parlementary  towns) th-  nobles of  the robe dominated the academies, 
which themselves  were privileged corporations  in a society characterized  by 
privilege  and corporateness.  The academies'  lower ranks (correspondatits  and 
associes) become increasingly  bourgeois as the century progressed-but  not 
bourgeois in the Marxist sense. The lesser academicians  were civil servants 
and professional  men, including a very high proportion of doctors and vir- 
tually no financiers,  industrialists,  or merchants,  even in the booming com- 
mercial  center  of Bordeaux.  Thus the academies  represented  a traditional  elite 
of notables, opening up increasingly  to men of  talent but not to capitalist 
entrepreneurs.  They were also open to new ideas. The topics set for their 
prize essay contests show concerns related to  the Enlightenment: humani- 
tarianism,  a tendency to move from abstract to utilitarian thought, and an 
increasing interest in political economy. The men who gave first prize to 
Rousseau's Discouirs  sur les sciences et les arts had a very unrousseauistic 
faith in the parallel  advancement  of science and social welfare. 
In his second article, Roche produced  a comparative  social analysis of the 
academicians  and the collaborators  of the Encyclopedie identified  by Jacques 
Proust  in Diderot et l'Encyclopedie.  Like the academicians,  the encyclopedists 
contained a large number of  professional men (especially the omnipresent 
enlightened  doctors), savants, and technicians  supplemented  by a heavy dose 
of nobles and civil servants (20 percent in each case)  but not a single mer- 
chant. So the Encyclopedie  itself seems to have represented  a tendency of old 
elites to assume a new role of intellectual  leadership  in conjunction  with the 
nascent "bourgeoisie  de talents" rather than the industrial-commercial  bour- 
geoisie.  That  conclusion  should be handled  with care, however,  because it rests 
on a fragile statistical base of  125 encyclopedists whose social and profes- 
sional status could be identified.  Since Diderot had more than 200 collabo- 
rators,  Proust and Roche may not have worked with representative  statistics. 
The statistics were too small, in any case, to represent large social groups. 
Because the encyclopedists included only nine abb6s, eight parlementaires, 
and seven lawyers, it does not follow that those three groups were more im- 
mune to encyclopedismne  than doctors, who contributed  twenty-two collabo- 
rators.  A dozen men in any category could change the statistical  picture com- 
pletely. As Proust pointed out, it was a community of  intellectual interest, 
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Encyclope'die. They did not cast off the old deference  patterns:  in fact  Proust 
found  a  kind  of  deferential  differential  in  Diderot's  correspondence,  which 
shows Diderot  talking down  to social  inferiors,  like  Rousseau,  while  chatting 
up more  established  writers,  like  Voltaire,  Buffon,  and Marmontel.30  None- 
theless,  a common  intellectual  cause  united the  men  at the center  of  the  En- 
lightenment.  When  their  message  spread outward,  it had to  pass  downward, 
through the traditional hierarchies of provincial  society.  This was the enlight- 
ening  process  as  d'Alembert  and  Voltaire  conceived  it-a  slow  seeping  of 
lumie're from  the top to the bottom  of  the social  pyramid,  without  any level- 
ing or  lowering  effects.  Thus  the  studies  of  Proust  and  Roche  complement 
each other nicely,  showing  the traditional society's  ability to absorb new  ideas 
and  the  traditional  elite's  capacity  for  acquiring  new  functions-but  not  a 
new  ideology  rising with  a  new  economic  class.  The  social  history  of  ideas 
seems to have broken out of  the old categories  of  Marxist  sociology.31 
Most  of  the  articles  in  Livre  et  societe  emphasize  continuity  rather  than 
change.  By macroanalysis  of  book  production  and by concentrating  on  peas- 
ants and provincials,  they  reveal  the weight  of  tradition  in the  cultural  lives 
of the great majority of  Frenchmen.  One study,  however,  by  Jean-Louis  and 
Marie Flandrin,  concerns  the  milieu  at the center  of  cultural  innovation,  the 
salon society  of Paris. Here,  as in Proust's work  on the encyclopedists,  quan- 
titative  history came  into  direct contact  with  the  Enlightenment.  The  Fland- 
rins tried to measure the literary experience  of the Parisian elite by tabulating 
references  to  books  in three  journals:  the  Jouirnail  of  Joseph  d'Hemery,  the 
police  inspector  for  the  book  trade; the  Metnoires  secrets  of  Bachaumont; 
and the Correspondance  litteraire  of  Grimm.  Each  of  the  three  was  written 
for  private  consumption  and  therefore  contained  material  on  avant-garde 
works that could not be reviewed in standard periodicals  like the scrupulously 
censored  Journal des savants.  A  statistical  analysis  of  reviews  in the Journal 
des saivtants  and in the Jesuit Memoires  de  Tre'votux  which  was  published  in 
volume  1 of Livre et socie't,  had revealed a "traditional" bias  almost  as pro- 
nounced  as in the  Furet  and  Brancolini-Bouyssy  studies.32 But  the  Parisians 
who  read and  sometimes  even  edited  these  censored  periodicals  came  from 
the  same  literary  circles  that  the  Flandrins  studied;  and  in  analyzing  the 
clandestine press the Flandrins  found unalloyed  Enlightenment.  Seen through 
the Journal des savants,  the Parisians  look  like  Brancolini's  provincials;  they 
kept to a sparse diet of  old-fashioned  devotional,  historical,  and legal  works, 
seasoned with some science.  Seen through the Mernoires secrets, the Parisians 
glutted  themselves  on  philosophy,  read very  little  history,  and  no  religious, 
legal,  or purely  scientific  books.  Wherever  the  distortion  may  be,  it  results 
from  the  selection  of  data,  not  from  statistical  imprecision.  The  Flandrins' 
statistics seem  impeccable,  but the journals  that provided  them did not  men- 
tion  all  the  books  read  in  salon  society.  They  referred  only  to  the  extra- 
ordinary, controversial books, the books that were talked about and that made 
30 Proust, chap. 1. 
31  Robert Mandrou's interpretation  of  Proust's research seems distorted, at least 
to this reader (see Mandroti, La Frantce  aux XVIP  et XVIII  s.iecles, pp. 168-69: 
"le XVIIIe siecle pense vraiment bourgeois"). 
32 Jean Ehrard and Jacques Roger, "Deux periodiques frangais du  18' siecle: 
'le Journal des savants' et 'les M6moires de Tr6voux.' Essai d'une etude  quantita- 
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news. These  journals were  really primitive  newspapers-nolivelles  d la  main 
-not  systematic  literary  reviews.  They  provide  information  about  literary 
vogues  but no quantifiable  index to book  consumption  that can be  compared 
with  the  statistics  of  Furet  and  Brancolini.  So  the  "circulation  du  livre"  in 
Paris  and  the  cultural  distance  between  Parisian  innovators  and  provincial 
lollowers  has yet to be measured. 
The  remainder of  Livre  et societe  constitutes  an  attempt  at  measuring  an 
even  more  elusive  phenomenon:  language.  Historical  semantics  is  now  a 
booming  discipline  in France  and  one  that  promises  to  enrich  the  standard 
views  of  the  Enlightenment  by  uncovering  implicit  concepts,  the  kind  that 
escape exegeses  of formal  thought):13  Unlike  conventional  lexicology,  histori- 
cal semantics  does  not treat words  as  isolated  units  but  rather as parts of  a 
semantic  field,  a  linguistic  structure  in  which  each  part  conveys  meaning 
through  its  function  within  the  whole.  To  grasp  the  meaning  of  individual 
eighteenth-century  words,  it  therefore  is  necessary  to  reconstruct  the  lin- 
guistic  structure  of  eighteenth-century  French,  treating  the  language  as  a 
fluid, socially  determined system of communication,  not as a fixed crystalliza- 
tion of thought  from  which  parts can be  arbitrarily detached.  Put  abstractly, 
these propositions  seem  reasonable  enough;  the difficulty  is to put  them  into 
practice by discovering  the mental processes behind eighteenth-century  French 
as it has come  down  to us in the form  of  words congealed  on  paper.  The  re- 
search for volume  1 of Livre et societe  produced  a special  collection  of  speci- 
mens of  this dead  communications  system-a  list  of  40,000  book  titles  reg- 
istered  for  privileges  and  permlissions tafites.  By  analyzing  each  title  as  a 
semantic field, computing  the results statistically,  and organizing  the statistics 
into  a  series  of  semantic  models,  Frangois  Furet  and  Alessandro  Fontana 
tried  to  get  at  the  meaning  of  two  eighteenth-century  words,  histoire  and 
methode. 
Fontana's  study,  the  more elaborate  and ambitious  of  the two,  best  repre- 
sents  this  new  historical  discipline.  After  100  pages  of  laborious  analysis, 
Fontana  produced  a  "structural profile"  of  eighteenth-century  meithode. In 
some  cases,  he  concluded,  nmthode  was  fixed,  final,  and  transcendental  or 
mathematical; in others it was fragmented,  variable,  and relative to particular 
disciplines.  Its varied  usage  revealed  a thought  pattern  moving  from  seven- 
teenth-century  apriorism  to  nineteenth-century  relativism,  and  so  suggests  a 
cosmological  shift that might be compared with the transition from the closed 
to the infinite universe that Alexandre  Koyre discerned in studying the history 
of  science. 
Whether  or  not  Fontana  proved  his  case  is  difficult  to  say,  owing  to  the 
linguistic  barriers to  understanding  linguistics.  No  uninitiated  reader  should 
confront Fontana's  monograph  unless armed with something  much more  for- 
midable  than  a  Petit  Larousse,  for  he  will  get  trapped  in  an  impenetrable 
semantic underbrush. He may pride himself  on having mastered the mots-cles 
of  the  "Annales"  school:  conjoncture,  contingence,  synchronie-diachronie, 
and mot-cle.  But what  is  he  to  make  of  mathesis,  apax,  inessif,  hendiadys, 
ethnoseme,  and semiosis?  At  the  risk of  seeming  ubusif,  anti-sememic,  or an 
:.4"  For reports on  the  state of  historical semantics, see  Actes  du  89c  con  gres 
des societes savantes (Paris, 1964), vol.  1; and M. Tournier et at., "Le vocabulaire 
de la Revolution: pouI  un inventaire syst6matique  des textes," Annales historiques 
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outright idiolect, this reviewer  must confess that he cannot follow Fontana's 
argument  and that he finds historical semantics more impressive  in principle 
than in practice. 
But the two volumes of Livre et societe do represent  an impressive  attempt 
to rescue the intellectual history of  eighteenth-century  France from vague 
generalizations  and to root it in the realities  of social history. They reveal the 
general contours of literary  culture as it was experienced by the great mass 
of eighteenth-century  Frenchmen  rather  than as it appears  in a few, posthu- 
mously selected classics. And they relate that literary experience to specific 
social groups-the  obscure millions who participated  in popular culture, the 
more elevated reading public of the provinces, the provincial elite, and the 
Parisian  avant-garde.  Whatever  their shortcomings,  these experimental  essays 
show that the social history of ideas can be written.  They do not redefine  the 
Enlightenment  any more successfully  than Gay does, but they help to situate 
it in the complex context of eighteenth-century  society. 
III 
The comparison of Gay's Enlightenm-ent and Livre et socite  suggests that the 
social history of  ideas must move out of  its armchair phase and into the 
archives,  tapping new sources and developing new methods. For how can it 
be written  from within the confines of even a first-rate  library?  To pull some 
Voltaire from the shelf is not to come into contact with a representative  slice 
of intellectual  life from the eighteenth  century,  because, as the Livre et societe 
essays show, the literary  culture of the Old Regime cannot be conceived ex- 
clusively in terms of its great books. Yet libraries  crammed  with classics can- 
not find room for the Bibliotheque  bleue, a genre too undignified  to be classi- 
fied with "books"  or to fit into our preconceptions  about "culture."  And every 
year our universities  turn out thousands  of certified  experts in Western  civili- 
zation who have read the Social Contract  many times and have never heard 
of Les quiatre  fils Aymnon. As far as the social history of ideas is concerned, 
the difficulty  is not simply in recognizing "low" as well as "high" culture, 
because Gay's techniques-a  matter of index cards and intelligence, but no 
original research-will  not even uncover the social history of the intellectual 
elite. The finances, milieux, and readership  of  the philosophes can only be 
known by grubbing  in archives. 
If read as conventional  intellectual  history, however, Gay's Enlightenment 
has the great advantage  of imposing new form on a great deal of unmanage- 
able old matter. Livre et societe  holds out little hope for arriving as such a 
heroic synthesis. Instead, it suggests that we must face another outbreak of 
monographs,  which will take us in a  dozen different directions, wherever 
the data lead. As the data tend to be statistical, they continually raise prob- 
lems about quantifying  cultural phenomena. Literary  journals cannot be re- 
duced meaningfully to bar graphs, and literary "influence"  still seems too 
intangible  to be computerized.  Statistics about book consumption give one a 
general  sense of the cultural terrain,  but do not explain the meaning of what 
it is to "consume"  a book. So the social history of ideas is searching for a 
methodology.  It will probably fall back on ad hoc combinations  of Cassirer 
and Mornet  until it develops a discipline  of its own. If those two masters  can- 
not yet be brought together in a new definition of the Enlightenment,  they 
cannot be left alone. And seen through the work of  their successors, their 
achievement  looms larger  than ever. 